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Abstract: This paper focuses on the legal and institutional framework of urban water services in Spain,
emphasizing water sanitation by using proposals that would positively contribute to wastewater
management in Brazil. The recent Brazilian Federal Law No. 14,026/20 aims to encourage investment
in water sanitation, promoting public-private collaboration formulas so that service management is
viable even in economically less-favored regions. In Spain, sanitation policies are aimed at fulfilling
the set of obligations and objectives imposed by European Union Directives within the environmental
policies of the Union. From an economic point of view, supply and sanitation water services are
classified at European legal framework as “services of general economic interest” (SGEI), not subject to
harmonized regulation and open to a natural monopoly provision regime, which they admit various
types of management formulas, public and private, based on the ownership and public intervention
of the service, both at national and European level. We believe that the Spanish experience in this
field, beyond its singularities, can serve as a useful reference for Brazilian’s urban wastewater new
regulation for several reasons: (1) Because of the decentralized political scheme that both countries
share and the need to articulate an adequate system of competencies in consequence; (2) Because of
the international experience that Spanish companies have at the sector’s technological forefront, they
are very competitive; (3) Due to the adequate functioning of the Spanish legal and organizational
framework since, despite its shortcomings, as we later will comment, it has managed to develop
successful financing formulas and management models that, in general terms, have allowed to
ensure with reasonable efficiency, continuity, stability and sustainability in the provision of urban
water services.
Keywords: urban water management; sanitation; public policies; sustainable development; public
contracts regulation; public-private collaboration
1. Introduction
This paper’s purpose is to prospect structural perspectives of management and legal
definition that contribute to universalization service, continuity and moderation (fair price)
of wastewater treatment in Brazil. By facing a comparative analysis between public and
private partnership policies in the European Union countries, especially in Spain. In the
following pages, we deepen in what aspects Brazil would implement to improve its water
quality policies in short term and provide the most efficient service to ensure its objectives
beyond political interests and economic factors that underlie the wastewater treatment
model’s decision.
Water Sanitation is crucial for hygienic-sanitary management and environmental
defense. Likewise, it is related to other economic and sectoral areas of the first magnitude:
urban planning, tourism, industrial and commercial exploitation, authorization, or water
quality. The United Nations (UN) estimates that 1 billion people lack sufficient water access,
and 2.6 billion lack basic sanitation. Also, it triggers an alert by pointing out that by the
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year 2025, a third of the world’s population will not have access to drinking water to satisfy
their basic needs. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development foresees 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDG) that must be reached by 2030. One of the objectives—number
six—seeks to “ensure the availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation
for all.” [1]. The United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the 2018–2028 decade as
the International Decade for Action, Water for Sustainable Development, which started
on World Water Day, 22 March 2018, and ends on World Water Day, 22 March 2028. The
UN resolution emphasizes that sustainable development and integrated water resources
management are crucial to achieving social, economic and environmental goals. The
document highlights the importance of implementing such programs and projects and
promoting partnerships and involving various stakeholders to fulfil the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, focusing on implementing SDG 6 of “ensuring the availability
and sustainable water management and sanitation for all” [1]. Water scarcity—exacerbated
by climate change and water-related disasters—can cause tensions that can become violent
conflicts between people, communities and countries. Sustainable Development Goals
(SDG) number 6 is also vital for preventing conflict and maintaining peace.
The Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, 28 July 2010 (A/RES/64/292)
recognizes access to water and sanitation as a fundamental human right for the full en-
joyment of life and necessary complement for reaching other fundamental rights [2]. In
its Resolution of 6 October 2010 (A/HCR/RES/15/9), the General Assembly encouraged
the States to include appropriate instruments for access to this service in their regulations.
However, the proliferation of armed conflicts, the rise of terrorism, uncontrolled population
growth, massive migrations, climate change, famines caused by lack of water and food
or the increased risk of contracting infectious and contagious diseases undermined the
achievement of this Right, limiting its effectiveness. Still, to this day, more than 2.6 billion
people do not have access to basic sanitation, so that every year around 1.5 million children
under five years of age die and 443 million school days are missed due to diseases related to
water and sanitation [1]. Overcrowding and survival in subhuman conditions are frequent
in populations with no access to drinking water or basic sanitation. Barlow (2015) discloses
the urgency of sanitation management for humanity, explaining how 70% of the population
runs or risk to live without adequate sanitation in 2030 [3].
Fortunately, neither Brazil, as an emerging country, nor Spain, as a developed coun-
try, are in the precarious situation that we have just described. Each in its proportion,
must undertake ambitious policies and investments both in terms of supply and, above
all, sanitation.
2. Materials and Methods
The paper carries out a deductive logical analysis by studying cases and the legal
literature and bibliographic references at a national and international level. In Brazil’s case,
materials from the National System of Information on Sanitation (SNIS, in Portuguese),
have been consulted. Furthermore, in the case of Spain, the XVI National Study on the
Supply of Drinking Water and Sanitation, elaborate by the Spanish Association of Water
Supply and Sanitation (AEAS, in Spanish) and the Spanish Association of Urban Water
Services Management Companies (AGA, in Spanish), which reaches 1795 municipalities
and 33.88 million inhabitants, 73% of the Spanish population.
Pasqualetto et al. indicate that the comparison between water resources policies
improves the planning and management mechanisms since the legal framework supports
public policies in water resources [4].
The analysis focuses on the contribution of one system to other by taking elements
from a legal system (Spain) that may contribute to another (that of Brazil). The results
pretend to form a perspective to infer the management of basic sanitation considering the
equal distribution of services, the power of contaminants and water pollutants, avoiding
waste of water, and aspects for thinking in the implemented legal models.
The following assumptions justify the comparison between Brazil and Spain:
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From a political and legal-administrative perspective, both countries have different
hydrographic and climatic conditions sharing a series of common features. Thus, both are
politically decentralized States and with important powers of the federated States and the
Autonomous Communities. In both cases, water management is based on hydrological
planning; and the public domain forms the basis for the legal consideration and regulation
of waters. Likewise, water quality is increasingly important, and the hydrographic basin
is considered a specific reference when constructing water management in both cases. To
this purpose, we find antecedents in the legal literature that specifically compare water
management in both countries [5].
In the field of urban water services, the municipal competence of the service, the de-
fragmentation of regulation models and the search for economies of scale in both countries
are common features in the comparison. The choice of the model is an eminently political
discretionary decision but based on legal and technical foundations.
The example of Spain may be useful to introduce European policies on environmental
matters and to approximate concepts of great relevance and meaning from the economic
and legal optic (consideration of regulated urban water management services as economic
services of general interest) within the framework of general liberalization, public contract-
ing and defense of competition.
Spanish companies are global leaders in comprehensive water management and are
pioneer at the forefront of water management technologies. Many of the main desalination
infrastructures in the world are built and managed by Spanish companies. This is recog-
nized by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation [6]. As it explains, seven
of the twenty largest desalination companies are Spanish. A Spanish company manages
the largest treatment plant in the world, among other examples of success. The Spanish
water governance system is an international benchmark and an example of success in the
Mediterranean region, being one of the world leaders in all management phases of the
integral water cycle.
It cannot be said that the public or private formula is better in Brazil or Spain. The
choice of model is related to the scale of security and service provision. The main strength of
the Spanish regulation model has been not to think in terms of administrative borders, but to
treat the space, the physical environment, where people live and work, adapting the model
to the technical characteristics available to the municipality: altitude, orography, availability
of the resource, governmental entities, number of inhabitants, infrastructures, etc. Although
the decision is ultimately political, an attempt has been made to justify it based on technical
and legal reasons and arguments, such as efficient service management or the search for
economies of scale. The Spanish legislator only allows the direct management of water
supply and sanitation when it is a more efficient option than indirect management and is
sustainable and effective, applying economic profitability criteria. On this side, the Spanish
model clearly opts for public and private collaboration models.
• Special attention must be paid to the necessary investment in the renovation of infras-
tructures or public assets in general.
• It is important to establish a correct coverage of costs with financing models that favor
the system’s sustainability.
• It is plausible to develop better specific legislation on the provision of urban water
cycle services, not only at the sanitation level. In Brazil’s case, it could be interesting to
introduce a general regulator (specific for basic sanitation; with exclusive dedication)
that, without modifying current competencies, controls and technically reviews the
provision of the service, improving the levels of transparency.
• Innovation and public-private collaboration should be promoted, attracting the tech-
nical knowledge and know-how of private companies.
Under these parameters, we conclude the comparison by establishing a series of
recommendations that can help in the implementation of the new Brazilian regulation
on wastewater management and sanitation policies as a representative field of research
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that requires comparative law solutions. In this sense, Brazil can benefit from other more
popular European experiences, such as Spanish.
Authors keep an academic relationship studying this field. During the last five years
various research actions were developed with the support of their partner institutions and
scientific centers, either by participating in congresses, seminars, dissertations, both in
Brazil and in Spain, or collaborating in publications related to the management of public
policies and the regulation of water resources.
The authors are aware of the difficulty of comparing two very different regimens,
which serve particular contexts, and the complexity of extrapolating results mechanically.
On the contrary, we aspire to introduce, through critical analysis, a constructive vision
based on the comparison between legal systems, to reflect on whether it would be possible
to apply in Brazil some of the solutions that have been effective in Europe and, more
specifically, in Spain.
3. Results
The research emphasizes in public and private partnership improving the public
responsibility system, and effectively adapting the regulatory and institutional structure to
manage the basic water sanitation service. The water sector integrates aspects related to
the circular economy, investments, social action mechanisms, health, economic and envi-
ronmental sustainability, etc. It is a strategic area that public authorities strive to improve.
The generally successful Spanish decentralized and atomized regulatory model may
be useful for Brazil’s experience. Among the most relevant issues, we highlight a series
of factors:
• The international experience and the high technological development of Spanish
companies, and the creation of formulas for public-private collaboration.
• The commitment to transparency and the establishment of accountability instruments
as part of the service contracting strategy, following European regulations.
• The debate about the need to establish a more operational control of the concession-
aires, independent of the direct or indirect management model.
• The convenience of integrating environmental regulations, public works and public
procurement, and developing general and specific planning instruments in wastewater
treatment.
• The importance of promoting competition within the limits of regulation of the ser-
vice, as well as working on a geographical and non-administrative scale, as well as
generating economies of scale that reduce the effective cost of the service.
On the other hand, the paper also aims to highlight two urban water management
mistakes in Spain and their possible usefulness for Brazil institutions.
First, avoid political criteria interference to decide the urban water management
model in each local government instead of attending economic and technical measures. An
effort should be made to not determine the model according to ideological approaches by
managing the information with transparency to prevent the decision from behaving like an
arcane of statistical, accounting and budgetary data that do not transcend public opinion.
Second, facing the severe deficit of structural investment in infrastructure and redesign
the financial and budgetary regime.
Finally, we analyze Brazil’s suitability to create an independent regulatory authority
that unifies the system and ensures economic and sustainability, as well as improves
transparency, offers neutrality and legal security, monitoring the national sanitation strategy
in Brazil.
The authors consider the convenience of thoroughly treating the related aspects of
water supply and wastewater treatment since these services are provided or contracted
in bulk, so their management is linked. In this way, this paper faces relevant factors that
could positively contribute to establishing a more efficient regulatory model in Brazil, as
follows (Table 1).
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Table 1. Comparative factors that may contribute to a more efficient water and sanitation system development.
Strengths of Spanish Legal Framework Reason of Inefficiency of the Factors Cited in the Case of Brazil
Decentralized Political System Brazilian new regulation centralizes sanitation strategies in theANA agency that takes control of water policies for Brazil.
International & technical experience as a successful formula
for public-private partnership.
In Brazil, basic sanitation service is mostly a state competence.
More adaptative management could provide greater adequacy
and private participation, making basic sanitation more efficient
in Brazil.
Awareness of the need for control of the concessionaires. Uncontrolled follow-up and monitoring of concessionaires(usually public companies) is notorious in Brazil.
Strengthening of anti-corruption mechanisms
There is no relevant information about the impact of corruption in
this sector. The system’s inefficiency and the cases of corruption
in similar segments of activity would indicate a significant gap to
reach basic sanitation in Brazil.
Transparency and accountability mechanisms.
Public institutions are making changes and doing things better,
such as ANA and SNIS. In collaboration with civil society entities
(Instituto Trat Brasil). However, a further improvement is
necessary on this topic.
Ensures basic sanitation regardless of economic
profitability—promotion of competitiveness.
In Brazil, the politic and governance greatly influence this issue.
For now (2021), unprofitable basic sanitation operations are at risk
of non-implementation.
Advanced legal framework and development of
environmental law instruments.
Brazil’s legal framework requires a holistic evolution in terms of
efficiency and procedural security
Develop specific environmental planning to set tangible
commitments and overcome the deficit of investments
Brazil may operate under financial instruments and specific
planning to reduce the prospective structural deficit
of investment.
Convenience of working based on technical monitorization of
the service and the creation of economies of scale
Brazil goes deep on the concept of economy of scale and the
effective cost of the service, bringing the management model’s
decision closer to more fruitful and profitable approaches.
Creation of an independent authority as an element of
standardization and predictability of the system
Brazil should create an independent technical authority that
moves the decision away from political parameters and
introduces technical rationality and control.
4. Discussion
4.1. Water Policies in Brazil: Challenges and Complexities in the New Brazilian Federal Law
No. 14,026/20
According to Caubet [7], Brazil has a large water resource availability (something
like 12% of all fresh water on the planet), including groundwaters. As a “continental
country” Brazil owns enormous water reserves, having great supply capacity. However,
these resources are not inexhaustible, and they cannot be enough if they are not well
managed or protected from pollution. They are also not well distributed in the territory.
Therefore, the price paid by the user for water supply and wastewater treatments is high.
There are risks in the continuity of this service’s provision (lack of legal guarantees). In this
order, there is an evident need for public policies to preserve natural goods and provide
an equal distribution of sanitation services. Likewise, the Brazilian Administration must
improve the techniques for managing the pollutants in water and control the growing
demand for the resource facing the increase in population, which also entails increasing
diffuse pollution sources in urban areas or run-off from agricultural land.
Between all of them, the Guarani Aquifer is the most representative freshwater reser-
voir and reaches the territories of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, with an
estimated extension of 1.2 million km2, of which 840,000 km2 are located in Brazilian
territory, containing an accumulated volume of water of about 45,000 km3.
Hussein [8] explains that Brazil has a hydro-hegemony in the South American region
due to its economic, military and geopolitical influence. Another factor of political size
over water, whether urban or not, is its water capacities to make money and investments.
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This potential brings obligations and commitments, such as access to drinking water and
basic sanitation.
According to D’Isep [9], water dignity is achieved by respecting quality (water may
be drinkable); the quantity, that is, enough for survival; the priority of human access, in
case of scarcity; and gratuity—at least about the minimum necessary for human survival.
Considering the water ecosystem in Brazil, there are 12 hydrographic regions, impacted by
Brazilian regulation.
The challenge to make public water management policy in Brazil involves some
factors: the size of the country, with different biomes and with social inequality among
the largest in the world [10]. Such aspects in themselves, dimension the greatness of the
task, which requires a broad effort of sustainable public policy, which universal access is
still an urgent measure—even more in times of pandemic. Along this path, there is a need
for broad cooperation between the State, capital and society so that in the institutional
spectrum, considering the actions of financing, management and social participation.
Da Silva et al. [11] also emphasize the importance of each nation’s political objectives,
according to the environmental policy in execution, since the intervention through, for
example, infrastructure and constitution of norms also influences the destinies that each
policy search as purpose.
One of the major problems is the non-treatment of wastewater, which dramatically af-
fects both surface and underground sources (Table 2). Brazilian Federal Law No. 14,026/20,
Art. 1, updates the legal framework for basic sanitation and amends Law No. 9984, of
17 July 2000, giving the National Water and Basic Sanitation Agency (ANA) the power to
establish standards for the regulation of public sanitation.
In Brazil, 19 million people living in urban areas do not have access to drinking water.
Another 21 million, living in rural areas, also do not have access to treated water, and only
46% of Brazilian households have sewage collection [12]. Some years ago, São Paulo’s city
faced hard rationing caused by the lack of rain and the pollution and contamination of the
water bodies that served as supply due to the low water treatment. Table 2 below refers
the situation of urban wastewater in Brazil:
Table 2. Annual water and sewage diagnosis, 2019 [13].
BASIC WASTEWATER & SANITATION DATA IN BRAZIL Targets to Implement Measures
Diagnosis 2011 2017 2019 2033
Loss of water in the distribution 38.8% 33.3% 39.2% 31%
Population with treated water 82.4% 83.5% 83.7% 99%
Population with sewage collection 48.1% 52.4% 54.1% 90%
Investment in billions of euros 1.67 1.67 2.009 112 (along the whole period)
From a legal perspective, competences of wastewater and sanitation services was
analyzed by the country’s Supreme Federal Court (SFC) by ADI No. 1842-RJ, that supervise
the Law that created the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian Supreme
Court stated that the municipality’s ownership will be constituted when the basic sanitation
cycle takes place entirely in its territory. The municipal entity can capture, supply water and
fulfil sewage treatments to the domestic areas, considering the collection, transportation
and operating. Otherwise, when the municipality cannot be responsible for the entire
basic sanitation cycle, the holder will be a collegiate (in the form of a public consortium)
representative of the metropolitan region or micro-region in which the municipalities
are inserted.
In summary, in Brazil, the Federal Union will not be the holder of the basic sanitation
service, municipalities or the metropolitan region will have such Right and duty. The new
Brazilian basic sanitation law—Federal Law No. 14,026/20, in its Art. 7, by changing Art.
8 of Federal Law No. 11,445/07, recognized this interpretation determined before by the
Brazilian Supreme Court.
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Article 8 of the Federal Law provides that under the Federal Law, related to the
provision of sanitation services, the State, together with the Municipalities that effectively
share operational facilities that are part of metropolitan regions, urban agglomerations
and micro-regions, will act together in the case of common interest. The exercise of
ownership of the sanitation services may also be carried out by associated management,
through a public consortium or cooperation agreement, under Art. 241 of the Federal
Constitution, generating specifics ways of an “inter-municipal autarchy”. These inter-
municipal consortiums of basic sanitation will have as their sole objective of financing
the initiatives for the implementation of structural measures for the supply of drinking
water, sanitary sewage, urban cleaning, solid waste management, drainage and rainwater
management, with no formalization of a program contract with a mixed capital company
or public company, or the sub-delegation of the service provided by the inter-municipal
authority without prior bidding procedure. The Sanitation Law pretends to reach a more
financial sustainability and preferably include at least one metropolitan region, provided
their integration by holders of sanitation services (§2). The holder of public sanitation
services must define the entity responsible for regulating and inspecting these services,
regardless of the type of provision (§5).
The Federal Union of Brazil can, through the country’s constitutional competences,
institute guidelines for basic sanitation, considering urban development: Art. 21 says
the Union is responsible for “instituting guidelines for urban development, including
housing, basic sanitation and urban transport”. There is a space for the Union to act by
issuing laws under basic sanitation in this context. However, this limit is very tenuous,
as holders of this public service, basic sanitation can also legislate on the subject, which
causes an evident overlap of sometimes conflicting rules. The issue is highly complex and
involves distinguishing what, objectively, is being legislated. The normative context may
be specified, whether in the technical question (types of technology; management and
operation goals for basic sanitation; service price; quality indicators; others); or in the legal
aspects (a form of contracting; the scope of service; quality of service; governance model;
period of service; guarantees of service provision; legitimacy conditions for provision).
Furthermore, pointing out guidelines and general guidelines.
On the other hand, some issues depend exclusively on the holders of essential sanita-
tion services’ actions. They are accurate Public Policy decisions, which imply optimizing
critical sanitation management by the competent Public Administration.
Managing and defining the destination of financial investments does not mean that the
holders of the basic sanitation service will be obliged to use these resources to implement
their water and sewage management agendas. However, they may follow the guidelines
instituted by the constituted authority to define reference standards, in this case, the
National Agency of Water and Basic Sanitation (ANA) of Brazil (linked to the federal
government). The fact is that ANA’s resource fund will have a large volume of financing
for basic sanitation in the country, making it very difficult for water and sewage service
providers to seek another source of funds. It is a “binding pecuniary force”, which in
practice means “whoever does not follow the reference rules dictated by ANA will not
have access to the Union’s resources”.
It is convenient to highlight that ANA had its attributions expanded (Article 2 of
Federal Law No. 14,026/20). In addition to the mission of taking care of national water
resources, it became responsible for establishing reference standards for public sanitation
regulation.
This role in establishing reference standards falls on three matters: the technical, legal
and political issue. In the legal field, ANA will regulate the standardization of business
instruments to provide public sanitation services between the holder of the public service
and the delegate entities.
In the technical area, it will regulate quality and efficiency standards in the provision,
maintenance and operation of basic sanitation systems; the tariff regulation of public sani-
tation services; establish the criteria for regulatory accounting; the progressive reduction
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and control of water loss; the reuse of treated sanitary effluents, by environmental and
public health standards.
Third, the political perspective will define the goals of universalization of public essential
sanitation services; define the methodology for calculating indemnities due to investments
made and not yet amortized or depreciated; regulate regulatory bodies’ governance.
Another important topic of the new Law is that the provision of public sanitation
services, which is not part of the holder managed, will depend on prior bidding, with
the subsequent conclusion of a concession contract, in which these must determine goals
of (1) expansion of services; (2) reduction of losses in the distribution of treated water;
(3) quality in the provision of services; (4) efficiency and rational use of water, energy and
other natural resources and (5) reuse of waste.
The contracting of a third entity (indirect management) that is not part of the holder’s
Administration will be prohibited in the model of program contract, agreement, term of
partnership or other instruments of a precarious nature. Those current regular program
contracts remain in effect until the end of their contractual period. It should be noted
that the new law prohibited the distribution of profits and dividends, of the contract in
execution, by the service provider that is not complying with the goals and schedules
established in the specific contract for the provision of public basic sanitation services.
Checking these challenges and complexities of the new legal framework for basic
sanitation in Brazil, one wonders: can the experience of the European community, especially
that of Spain, offer recommendations and perspectives allowing to assist the Brazilian
experience in deciding. Whether the new legal definitions permeate the best way to provide
the service, either directly, or indirectly by public or private operator. What is the more
adequate partnership and public contracting model; What is the inspection model; What
is the dispute resolution model; What is the tariff structuring model; Which model to
choose (bidding), if based on price, service quality and environmental quality criteria; per
sustainability requirement.
This study assumes that yes, the Spanish experience can contribute to the implemen-
tation of public policies on basic water and sanitation in Brazil, since the principles of
universality, continuity, and more efficient water supply and wastewater management.
4.2. Spanish Urban Water Management’s Legal Framework
4.2.1. Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment’s State of Art
Spain entirely complies with the United Nations Resolution by guaranteeing all
citizens’ right to have sufficient, safe, quality, accessible and affordable water, both for
personal and domestic use. Even though in some areas of Spain water is a scarce and
poorly distributed resource, it has been possible to guarantee the supply through public
works investments financed with European and national funds. Users and private capital
also participate. That allowed mitigate crises caused by water scarcity (structural situation)
and drought (short-term deficit). Supposing we were qualifying urban water management
in Spain, it would obtain a remarkable grade in water supply and a fair approval in terms
of sanitation and purification. Water supply and quality has been ensured, with positive
advances from public and private management. However, there is still an investment
deficit problem that is even more acute in sanitation infrastructures addressed with Spanish
fulfilment with EU wastewater treatment legislation controversial. Thus, the coverage
is close to 90% of the total concerning the pollutant load. However, it is still far from
the ambitious objectives set by the EU Water Framework Directive 2000/60/CE (WFD)
for purification water in municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, since only
32% of these Spaniard’s territories have the tertiary treatment systems as required by
EU legislation [14]. As we can see, the provision of urban water services is a first-order
challenge for humanity, which operates with different degrees of efficiency in each country
depending on its capabilities of Development. Since water scarcity and unjust distribution,
water management is associated with risks that enhance these challenges, such as legal
complexity and environmental unsustainability. The Human Right to water supply and
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sanitation around the world is still an asymmetric and scalable conquest. The integration
of different SDG 6 framework policies is a representative strategy for addressing the
major bottlenecks and threats. The European Union overview—compared to emerging
countries—offers adaptable solutions for Brazilian new regime.
As established by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2001, of 20 July 2001, which approves
the Spanish Water Law’s revised text (therefore TRLA), water is a public good. Its use is
subordinate to the general interest. The urban water supply occupies the first order of
priority, by legal imperative, above other consumptive and non-consumptive uses (Art. 60).
The supply of water (upper and lower phases) consists of the collection and delivery of
water (adduction), treatment for human consumption (purification), transport through
arteries or main pipes, storage in regulatory tanks at the head of population centers and the
completion in the connections and meters of the houses. Includes domestic and urban uses;
by the contrary, excludes agricultural and industrial services (except for small amounts
and connected to a municipal network) [15].
With an average water consumption of 128 liters per inhabitant/day, the average
price of domestic water in Spain is one of the lowest in Europe (Figure 1). It stands at
around 0.9% of the total expenditure of Spanish households, significantly less than 3%,
which is the UN’s reference in the case of supply as a limit of affordability to guarantee
humanitarian standards.
Figure 1. Evolution of the urban water supply (blue) and sanitation (red) price in Spain (euro/m3). Source: Locken smart
access solutions company, 2016 [16].
The water sector is peculiar when compared to other regulated sectors of economic
activity. Different existing water management models coexist in it (direct, indirect and
mixed management). The water management model in Spain serves as a reference to other
countries in the world. However, the water sector’s problem is complicated because an
ideological perception persists where there should only be a technical analysis.
When deciding on the management model, the Local Entities exercise a discretionary
power that must be motivated according to efficiency parameters. Ninety-five per cent
of Spanish municipalities have less than 20,000 inhabitants. Due to the high cost of con-
structing treatment plants, public administrations should rethink whether competition in
sanitation and treatment should continue to be managed mainly by municipalities, given
the supra-local and State interest in this regard [17].
In Spain, a classic decentralized model prevails. The continuity of the service and
competitiveness are more successful than the ex-post control carried out after contracting.
Heterogeneous regulation sometimes prevents sufficient stability and legal certainty from
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being achieved, and can hold back private investment. Nevertheless, the competition and
technological support to create efficient units is a strength of the system.
One of the most severe problems is the heterogeneity of rates and the difficulty of
achieving self-sufficient cost structures (cost recovery principle). In many cases, the price
asymmetry is justified for technical reasons. However, in others, the indirect costs related
to the service provision, such as the depreciation of the infrastructure, the financing costs
or the opportunity cost, are not correctly incorporated into public accounting systems.
There are differences of up to 5 percentage points between the municipalities that pay
the most and the municipalities that pay the least for water in Spain. The disparity of tax
figures between regions, as significantly happens with the sanitation fee, makes it difficult
to carry out a homogeneous analysis. Likewise, the investment effort, more consistent in
past decades, has been considerably reduced, generating a structural deficit that prevents
infrastructure renovation.
4.2.2. Diversity of Models and Atomization of Urban Water Management Entities
With 0.65% of GDP, Spain’s water sector has a turnover of 7654 million euros per year
and offers direct and highly qualified employees to more than 32,000 people [18]. It is a
dynamic and mature sector with great employability, high capacity for innovation and
future. The global leadership and competitiveness of the industry’s Spanish companies
appear to consolidate thanks to the optimization and internationalization of processes
and the development of research and development and innovation projects. However, its
success is also the result of the experience of managing a traditionally scarce resource in
Spain, which has forced it to perfect its forms of management [19].
According to the latest data from the sector [20], 35% of the population is managed by
public entities, 33% by private companies, 22% by joint ventures and the remaining 10% by
municipal services. This atomized management is organized into more than two thousand
independent services, and many others delegated to supra-municipal entities. In general, it
cannot be said that there is a preference for public or private management, nor that one or
the other is more efficient or more appropriate under Spanish regulation. The final photo
shows the operational balance between direct and indirect management modalities.
The choice of the model, i.e., the service provision, depends on each municipality’s
conditions to operate in a given context; and technical and political factors. Comprehensive
water management following pure efficiency parameters would lead us not to think in
terms of administrative boundaries, but rather to seek management formulas that take into
account space, physical contour, hydraulic works, terrain orography, scale economics. In
short, the territorial and demographic scope in which people live and work. The decision
to choose one model or another depends on the municipality or municipalities’ technical
and volumetric characteristics that water services must be provided: altitude, orography,
availability of the resource, government entities, number of inhabitants or technological
infrastructures. Moreover, above all, the costs of providing the service or the effective
cost of the service. Regulation and calculation of operating costs are essential to ensure
the viability of the model and guarantee supply. The urban water cycle management
model is (or, at least, should be) a political decision based on technical, economic and
legal parameters.
Urban water services are provided under a quasi-monopoly regime. They must be
insured and regulated by the Administration (Art. 25.2, 26 and 86.2 of Law 7/1985, of
2 April 1985, handling the Local Regime’s Bases Law (therefore, LBRL). Article 106.2 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishes the non-application
of competition rules with the provision of these services. It considers the water supply
and sanitation service as an economic service of general interest subject to environmental
regulation by the EU (DMA) and water quality protection (purpose of economic, water
and social efficiency) [21]. It is a functional concept that does not consider who owns the
service or who provides it, nor its formal legal regime, allowing a more limited or moderate
application of EU competition law concerning those activities that respond to this notion
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of general interest. It caters, fundamentally, to the needs of the general welfare and its
submission to obligations and rules that exempt free competition and are defined as public
service or universal service obligations.
Urban water services are made up technically with different activities, although not
sufficient from a physical, legal, accounting, and functional perspective. In Spain, water
is in the public domain, and the regulator is the Public Administration. There are no
privatizations of water as a public good; its use and exploitation is subject to a concession
and authorization regime. Sanitation services are usually provided by the same operator
that supplies the water. In some municipalities, management is done by private borrowing
companies under a concession, joint venture or other indirect management modalities.
Nevertheless, water, it is important to underline, continues to be publicly owned. The most
important responsibilities, both with regulation and inspection and control of the service,
correspond to the Public Administration [22].
The current regulation model of urban water services in Spain is articulated under
a decentralized regime. The competencies that affect the integral urban water cycle are
fragmented. The resource allocation between different users and the discharges’ control
depends on the competent authorities in water matters, the Basin Organizations (hydro-
graphic confederations and autonomous organizations). The municipal government owns
the water supply and sanitation services (city councils and county councils). The manage-
ment of water quality depends on various administrations (Basin Organizations, Ministry
of Health, Autonomous Communities or Local Administrations). The tariff and price
structure depend on the municipal bodies, although the Autonomous Communities set fees
for purification. In many cases, cooperation and collaboration between administrations are
frequent through Agreements and administrative integration formulas that provide novel
solutions and sufficient financing to develop expensive hydraulic infrastructures. And,
also, through the rest of specific sectors of regulation.
The local administration, mainly, is competent to provide urban water services taking
control and providing the service or contracting with an entity by indirect management.
However, the power of control (whether this Administration exercises direct supervision
or not) is inalienable and must be produced. This issue is often neglected due to the lack
of technical capacity and specialized knowledge of the Administrations; but, also, due
to a lack of interest, responsibility or personal resources as Arana García has stated: “A
large criticism spilt on the breaches or irregularities of the private agents is mainly due
to the absolute lack of control or cooperation on the part of the public Administrations
that manage the urban water services. Why has this happened? Often, due to the lack of
technical capacity and knowledge on the administrations that own the service. Clearly,
in others, due to a tacit and unspeakable agreement between service providers and the
responsible Administration. The Administration can relax its controls by not demanding
from the private partner certain benefits or obligations in exchange for financing for the
City Council on duty or as a placement agency for those related to the party in power” [23].
4.2.3. The Effective Cost and the Preference for Indirect Management
The Bases Law of the Local Regime (therefore, LBRL) establishes that domiciliary
supply and sanitation services are municipal responsibility. The Spanish Administration’s
self-organization power allows the use of discretionary formulas to a certain extent to
choose the direct and indirect management formulas that best suit its characteristics.
However, the legislation establishes limitations that reduce the margin of discretion when
choosing one model or another. The Art. 86.2 of Law 40/2015, of 1 October 2015, on the
public sector’s legal regime, establishes that direct management can only be chosen if it is a
more efficient option than public procurement and is sustainable and effective, applying
profitability criteria economical. In practice, this precept constitutes a principle of economic
subsidiarity (preference for indirect management unless it is conclusively proven that direct
management is more efficient and profitable).
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In this sense, also, the wording of Art. 85.2 of the LBRL after the reform carried out
by Law 27/2013, 27 December 2013, on rationalization and sustainability of the Local
Administration (hereinafter, LRSAL), which establishes that: “must manage public services
the most sustainable and efficient way among those listed below . . . ”. The precept opts
for the most efficient and sustainable formula, responding to economic criteria that avoid
increasing debt, adjusting the recipe to a balanced budget. One or another’s choice must
be accredited and motivated in the administrative file in which they decide for a direct or
indirect model.
Art. 116 ter of the LBRL establishes a series of transparency and accountability
measures, including assessing the cost of services as a rationalization parameter. It also
determines the effective cost and recovery of the expenses of the services they provide local
entities. And the referral to the Ministry of Finance of the decision for the publication of
this information.
The impact of costs on users defended by the OECD [24] is based on water-related
services in triple financing: public transfers, tariffs and taxes. The Ministerial Order of
the Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations HAP/20175/2014, of 6 November
2014, establishes the criteria for calculating the effective cost of local entities’ services.
The effective cost (different from the real cost of providing a local service) should serve
as the basis for selecting the management model to be implemented. That unified or
supra-municipal forms of provision should be chosen when the costs are lower. When
the Provincial Council proves that the agreement of two or more municipalities for the
integrated management of all municipal services that are coincident entails a saving
of at least 10% for the total effective cost in which each city separately incurred, the
coefficient of Weighting will be taken into account to facilitate an integrated management
of service as set the article 124.1 of Royal Legislative Decree 2/2004, of 5 March 2004, which
approves the revised text of the Regulatory Law of the Local Finances. The Art. 26.2 LBRL,
after the 2013 reform, establishes that in municipalities with a population of less than
20,000 inhabitants, the supra-municipal entity (Provincial Government or an equivalent
entity) will coordinate the provision of, among others, the drinking water supply service to
domicile and evacuation and wastewater treatment.
When the municipality justifies before the Provincial Government that it can provide
these services with an effective cost lower than that derived from the form of management
proposed by the Provincial government or an equivalent entity, the municipality may
assume the provision and coordination of these services. When the Provincial Government
or equivalent entity provides these services, the service’s effective cost will be charged to
the municipalities based on its use.
The effective cost means identifying real assessment in providing the services as they
are defined through the municipal budgets’ information to establish some indicators of
efficiency and quality for the service to a homogeneous group of municipalities standard-
izing the calculation methodology. The objective is aimed to eliminate administrative
duplications and reducing public spending. The approval of the management formulas’
limitations has raised conflicts related to local autonomy (Spanish Constitutional Court
Sentences 41/2016, of 3 March 2016, and 111/2016, of 9 June 2016). In general, experience
shows that public administrations are unwilling to assume powers if a budget increase
does not accompany them.
Unfortunately, one management model’s choice or another has been influenced by
ideological conceptions, according to which its supporters have chosen to defend the
alleged advantages of one management model over the other. Arguments in favor of
indirect management mean a more specialized companies’ know-how and advanced
knowledge that would generate an extensive and diversified management experience. It is
also value:
• The cost savings that may come from having to achieve contractually predefined
financial profitability targets;
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• The greater transparency, by having to comply with the rules that govern for commer-
cial companies;
• The more significant raising of private capital to finance infrastructure, which results
in less financial responsibility for the State;
• The fact that it can help reduce political interference and make operational plans to
develop longer-term approaches, regardless of political times;
• Or, finally, that the Administration continue to reserve, as the service owner, the ability
to oversight and demand contractual compliance with the agreed requirements by not
taking a party position.
On the contrary, indirect management would consolidate -with no control- a natural
monopoly in which large lobbies and business groups share the market. Measures can also
increase collection in citizens’ invoices due to the need to increase commercial margins, or
small and medium-sized companies’ participation can be reduced at the local level.
4.3. Urban Water Control: From Responsibility to Transparency
The water administration’s transparency requires that, regardless of the chosen model,
public or private, the decision be sufficiently motivated according to technical, economic,
and financial studies that demonstrate and accredit, in reliable terms, its suitability. Thus,
political control is a decisive factor in the decision’s behavior, and, as such, it deserves to be
analyzed [25]. Public-private participation, usually is articulated through a public contract
that defines the effectiveness of the provision to be made and the terms in which the legal
relationship must be developed. The degree of detail with which the obligations are drawn
up in the contractual specifications may condition the provision’s purpose [26].
The EU Directives on public procurement have introduced variations with the powers
attributed to the “contracting body” (before contracting) and the “person responsible for
the contract” (after contracting the service), or the new control system and supervision of
public procurement, all of them of great importance and complexity, which we cannot go
into at this time. We want to mean that the Administration has a reviewing power as the
service owner and must assert its powers of inspection and control towards the service
providers, regardless of whether the legal relationship is based on a principle of legitimate
confidence. This verification can be carried out both in regulation and provision, through
essential documents to support the legal relationship: service regulations, administrative
specifications, Supply Master Plans, financial studies, rate policies, annual reports and au-
dits, instruments of public information and citizen participation, etc. Efficient management
must promote competition, define the obligations through technical reports, clarify the
parties’ functions and rights, and grant due to predictability and legal certainty, describing
the service’s operational risk issues.
For European regulation, the management formula chosen for the provision of public
services is indifferent, as established by Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament, of
26 February 2014, on contracts concession. Nevertheless, the need to promote public-private
collaboration to finance infrastructures and hydraulic systems (construction, renovation,
management and maintenance) is recognized; and as a mechanism, to attract technological
knowledge and capacities in the field of research, development and innovation.
Law on Public Contracts 9/2017, 8 November 2017, integrates the EU Directives’
content on public contracts and places the accent on mixed economy companies. A public
operator (Administration) participates and a private operator (technological partner) as a
successful management model [27].
The process of integrating public-private collaboration also materializes in the reduc-
tion of contractual figures and administrative simplification in order to reduce indirect
management contracts to two specific types: concession contracts and service contracts,
depending on the existence or non-transfer of the “risk of providing operation” or “oper-
ational risk”, as derived from the transposition of the package of Community Directives
on procurement, defined as that which is beyond the control of the parties and occurs as a
consequence of the uncertainties of the market. It consists of a demand risk or a supply risk,
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which capitalizes the net present value of all the concessionaire’s investments, costs, and
income. This operational risk is also linked to factors of competition, insolvency of debtors,
insufficient income, or derived from liability for damages caused by an irregularity in the
provision of the service. It consists of a demand risk or a supply risk, which capitalizes the
net present value of all the dealer’s investments, costs, and income. This operational risk
is also linked to factors of competition, debtor insolvency, insufficient income, or derived
from liability for damages caused by an irregularity in the provision of the service [28].
It is raised whether it is possible to redeem a concession to provide the service directly
when provided indirectly. In any case, the concession rescue is a discretionary decision
that can only be adopted “if there is a prevailing public interest mediating compensation in
favor of the concessionaire for the damages that said agreement causes it” (Spanish Council
State Opinion No. 2918/2003).
The concession rescue is a cause for termination of the contract, not due to contractual
breach attributable to the contractor, but based on a cause of public interest. A confiscation
implies an obligation to compensate the contractor according to a discretionary decision
under control by the Courts, requiring a motivation and economic rationale.
In broad, progress has been made towards a disappearance of the bailout as a prerogative
of the public Administration. Furthermore, when this happens, it tends to materialize as part
of an administrative liability system that requires expropriation and financial compensation.
4.4. Water and Sanitation as a Strategy of Public Health and Democratization in Brazil. What
Would We Learn from Spain?
4.4.1. Wastewater Treatment: A Recovery Master Plan for Leaving Behind the Covid-19 Crisis
Urban water management is linked with global phenomena and changes that could
affect to the resource availability. Among them, it is worth mentioning the climatic change
and the fulfilment of the principles that govern the management of the resource: water econ-
omy, efficiency, management unit, water unit, respect to hydraulic systems, environmental
sustainability, restoration of nature, cost recovery, demand satisfaction, regional balance
and development, etc. Similarly, technological transformations, significant investments
and the development of concepts such as circular economy, water quality and ecological
transition are predicted.
Basic sanitation is a pillar to improve people’s lives and the environment in which they
live, being one of the leading indicators of a country’s quality and social and economic well-
being. Under the United Nations’ supervision, developed countries have been struggling
to develop programs to improve water and sanitary conditions, which are very precarious.
International cooperation, based on the creation of backgrounds and contingency networks,
as well as the provision of technical assistance to improve the living conditions of affected
communities through approaches such as “AAAQ-criteria” or “4A-criteria “, which al-
lows to develop a framework of action based on availability, accessibility, affordability,
acceptability and quality of access to water and sanitation.
Basic sanitation of water is a prerequisite for achieving human rights. However, it
also requires to implement tangible public policies in housing, education, equality, eco-
nomic, etc. However, securing basic sanitation for populations is a challenge in emerging
countries like Brazil, since access to drinking water and sanitary sewage treatment prove
to be costly services, and cannot always be provided by the municipalities, in a way that
adds incompetence in public management, social inequality and the growth of environ-
mental degradation.
In Brazil, at least 83.5% of the population has drinking water supply, and 52.4% has
collection of sanitary sewage, with only 73.7% of the sewage being treated with conditions
to return to the system [29]. This percentage is much higher than that registered in the
countries of the European Union, which allows European administrations to focus on
developing other public policies, such as the reuse of water and organic matter, energy and
climate change, reduction of impacts and conditions that may have other sectoral policies
such as urban regulations and waste disposal.
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The new Brazilian Federal Law No. 14,026/20 aims to encourage the investment
strategy by promoting public-private collaboration formulas, making the system economi-
cally viable even in regions that may be less profitable due to their population or technical
characteristics or accessible to the provide this service. The role of the State, in this sense,
is aimed at promoting business investment in areas that are less attractive for investment
by large corporations in the water sector. The Brazilian model, territorially dispersed, but
with large megacities that absorb most of the country’s population and services, aims to
redesign the formulas for providing these services to encourage investment and establish
better transparency accountability mechanisms in public management [30].
Thus, water sanitation can be a development and recovery lever in the exit strategy
from the Covid-19 crisis. The European water sector has recently made proposals to
materialize investment in the urban water cycle’s specific projects, totaling 13,775 million
euros. Not only that, sanitation policies are related to values of any democratic society
such as the Right to life-hygiene and the environment, but other global strategies such
as climate change mitigation or the fight against the pandemic are also connected. For
example, these are reflected in the application of technologies that minimize the carbon
footprint, the sampling that has been carried out to control the coronavirus in large cities,
or the strengthening of the European Circular Economic Strategy. In Spain, for example,
more than two-thirds of the operators in the water sector have energy use devices and have
plans to control the carbon footprint [18].
Therefore, it is not surprising that the United Nations General Assembly has desig-
nated the Resolution of 25 September 2015 (A/RES/70/1) the sanitation service as one of
the new 2030 Agenda’s central axes. Concerning the Brazilian context, sanitation appears
as goal number 6 of the SDGs, being undoubtedly one of the most critical targets.
4.4.2. Wastewater Treatment and Policies in Europe
Water Sanitation is a topic of a greater importance, given its environmental and
hygienic-sanitary imprint, as well as to the preservation of the quality of the waters and
the associated ecosystems. The assurance of its provision, the control of public-private
participation, and economic-financial management are the main lines of action.
In the 90s of the last century, The European Union published two necessary Directives
on sanitation [31,32]: first, Directive 91/271/EEC, of 21 May 1991, concerning urban
wastewater treatment (DUWT), under which obligations were established aimed at Member
States consistent in adopting the appropriate measures to ensure that wastewater was
adequately treated in a phase before its discharge; and, secondly, the Water Framework
Directive (WFD), which establishes the Community framework for action in the field of
water policy, which imposes the achievement of objectives environmental quality and
constitutes the leading standard of European water law and the most critical measures in
the ecological field [33].
Focusing on the DUWT, it was transposed into the Spanish Regulation by Royal
Decree-Law 11/1995, 28 December 1995, which establishes the rules applicable to urban
wastewater treatment. With its transposition, a technical criterion of great relevance is
introduced: the number of inhabitants-equivalents, a concept that defines the polluting
load of both people, animals and industries, and urban agglomerations, which are the areas
that present a sufficient concentration to collect and conduct wastewater independently.
Likewise, the standard clarifies concepts such as urban, domestic or industrial wastewater.
The Directive established a set of obligations to which it conferred progressivity and
greater or lesser flexibility over time (differentiating the groups according to whether they
had between 2000–10,000 hectares, more than 10,000 hectares, or more than 15,000 hectares),
requiring the provision of systems of collectors, the condition of WWTP with “secondary
treatment” and the provision of WWTP with “adequate treatment”. Finally, it established
prior regulations or specific authorizations for all discharges into the natural environ-
ment from urban wastewater treatment plants and the agri-food industry’s facilities and
industrial wastewater discharge to urban wastewater collection treatment systems.
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The urban wastewater law was developed in Spain by Royal Decree 509/1996, of
15 March 1996 (Table 3). Its execution and possible development corresponding to the
Autonomous Communities, which have defined, correlatively, the municipal powers, in
the cases in which they have developed it.
Table 3. European Union regulation and its implementation in Spain.
Field Basic EU Regulation Spanish Regulation Implementation
Comprehensive water protection Directive 2000/60/CE
RDLeg. 1/2001 (TRLA)
RD 849/1986 (RDPH)
O. ARM 2656/2008 (IPH)
River Basin Management Plans (RBMP)
RD 817/2015, (RDE)
Urban wastewater and sensitive areas Directive 91/271/CE RD 509/1996RDL 11/1995
Vulnerable areas and affected waters Directive 91/271/CE RD 261/1996
Integrated pollution control Directive 2010/75/UE RDL 1/2016
Despite the transposition of the DUWT into the Spanish legal system and the approval
by the Spanish State of plans to carry out the EU Directive (see ut. infra), the Kingdom
of Spain has been condemned by the Court of Justice of the European Union in several
pronouncements for not complying with the Directives. The reasons have been diverse,
such as not having treated the water coming from urban agglomerations with a population
of more than 20,000 equivalent inhabitants or the lack of construction of treatment plants
in urban agglomerations with more than 15,000 inhabitants (see the 2018 Sentence of the
European Court of Justice, C-205/17).
The mandatory full purification of waters implies that the Kingdom of Spain through
National Administration faces the liability from the European institutions in non-compliance.
The lack of definition with the responsible authority has caused failures in the responsibility
system when, for example, the Autonomous Communities have decided not to intervene
by regulating or managing the service. In general terms, the design of responsibilities is
not easy to define, neither according to the establishment of a sanitation fee that makes the
principle of solidarity effective (the cost of treatment plants is variable depending on many
parameters), nor in regarding the distribution of financial obligations [34].
According to recent data, of the 2100 agglomerations of more than 2000 inhabitants
that must purify their waters in Spain, about 550 are in non-compliance [35] (Figure 2).
The problem is rooted in the dispersion of powers and the municipalities’ limited financial
capacity to undertake these works, which can be very expensive.
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Figure 2. Evolution of the volume of wastewater collection (green) and treated water reuse (blue) in Spain. Source: Spanish
DSEAR Plan draft, 2020.
4.4.3. Wastewater, Sewage, Purification and Sanitation’s Public Services: The Difficult
Separation and the Problems of Management that this Entails
The sanitation service encompasses actions that include the collection and conduction
of the water, its treatment, and its return to the environment. These technically differ-
entiated processes aim to eliminate or reduce the waters’ pollutant load before they are
discharged into the receiving environment, the public channels. As a service of the urban
water cycle, the collection of urban and rainwater wastewater from population centers
through municipal sewerage networks to the point of interception with the general collec-
tors or the collection point for treatment, depends on a complex infrastructure network
that requires a large investment.
Wastewater can contain untreated substances like nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus);
solids (including organic matter); pathogens (including bacteria, viruses, and protozoa);
helminths (intestinal worms and worm-like parasites); oils and fats; runoff from streets,
parking lots and roofs; heavy metals (including mercury, cadmium, lead, chromium,
copper) and many toxic chemicals, including PCBs, PAHs, dioxins, furans, pesticides,
phenols, and chlorinated organics.
The terms ‘wastewater’ and ‘sewage’ are regularly used interchangeably, however
there are differences between both. In fact, ‘sewage’ is considered a subset of wastewa-
ter [36]. Wastewater is water that has suffered anthropogenic influence and has deteriorated
its quality. It includes liquid waste from residences, businesses, industries and agriculture
and can encompass a wide range of pollutants. Sewage is the water contaminates with
faeces or urine, although it is also often used to refer to any wastewater, meaning the water
that is conducted through pipes and sewage systems. On the other hand, sanitation refers
to the set of sanitary measures and actions to prevent and avoid health hazards.
Wastewater treatment is aimed at improving the environmental quality of public
waters [37]. It consists of collecting urban and rainwater wastewater from urban population
centers through municipal sewage networks to the point of interception with the general
collectors or to the end of collection for treatment or purification. Thus, wastewater
sanitation is made up of two phases: low sanitation (purification process by which the water
reaches an acceptable or sufficient environmental quality standard per the regulations)
and high sanitation (consisting of its return to the environment once the waters have been
purified) [38]. Thus, sanitation, as a network system, depends on other processes: the
purification of wastewater (through a process of interception and transport across general
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collectors, its treatment and the discharge of the effluent to continental or maritime water
bodies), the management of the spill (the administrative authorization where the conditions
are established in which the treated water must be returned to the environment) [39] and
the reuse/regeneration of water (through which the water is reused, once purified, in cases
where to be determined, being destined for other uses such as garden irrigation or street
washing) [40]. Purification is the prelude to reuse, so when speaking of sanitation and
water treatment, we would not be referring so much to the management of a waste, but the
use of an authentic resource [41]. However, water reuse is still an underused resource due
to social resistance and demanding sanitary regulations.
Sanitation can be carried out through unitary or separate networks. The former is
designed and built to receive a single conduit, mixing both the wastewater (urban and
industrial) and the rainwater generated in the metropolitan area covered by the network.
On the other hand, the separative networks introduce two independent channels: the
sanitary sewer system and, the other, the storm sewer system. The separative network is
ideal, since it reduces purification costs and simplifies processes, since the treated flow
is lower and more constant; it also allows transporting a lower polluting load. For the
proper functioning of the separative networks, there must be a control of discharges and
diffuse points of contamination and the duplication of downspouts in building installations
(using technical standards in building matters). The inspection and monitoring of the
same, and the cleaning and conservation, the control of illegal dumping, are decisive
elements of action, which must be helped by the correct technical design. So the networks
of infrastructures must have an adequate hydraulic constructing design, with a suitable
slope, avoiding siphons and installing cesspools by doing the appropriate maintenance
and conservation work.
For example, a pipe inclined according to a correct velocity is considered to be one in
which the water moves at a speed of 0.46 m/s. At a lower rate, solid matter can tend to
settle and clog the conduits. Monitoring of the same, and the cleaning and conservation,
the control of illegal dumping, are decisive elements of action, which must be helped by
the correct technical design. Among the main problems that sewage networks support
are: obstruction by roots, damage by works, aggressive spills, or the reduction of water
capacity due to the block of substances, mixtures and, remains of textiles or wipes [42].
This raises the cost of maintenance work and damage to infrastructures, with inspection
and cleaning operations critical to prevent and reduce these damages in their different
technological manifestations.
Most of the Spanish municipalities have organized and managed purification in a
way other than supply. As a legal activity, water Sanitation is challenging to conceptualize
due to the proliferation of rules regulating it [43]. Some use the terms “sanitation” and
“purification” interchangeably, referring in some cases to sanitation (Art. 25.2 LBRL) and in
others to “purification” (86.3 LBRL) as equivalent [44].
The difference between high and low sanitation in the Spanish system can become
significant due to the competence problems that arise, because, although the sewerage
is a municipal responsibility, the collectors or conduits that collect and conduct urban
wastewater from the Sewerage networks to the treatment station are regional competence if
their legislation so provides. Also, more and more, to supply and sanitation, the activity of
reusing water for purposes other than human consumption is added, making it possible that
the water can be used, once it has been purified, being destined for other uses (irrigation of
gardens, street washing). Despite everything, it is, to this day, a resource that is underused
due to the reluctance of society and the psychosocial component that its added uses entail.
Notwithstanding the lack of definition of competencies is the difficulty of separating
the technical processes that negatively affect the liability system. In this way, the State can
intervene to dictate primary legislation on the basis and general coordination of health
(Art. 149.1.16 CE), the bases of the local action regime (Art. 149.1.18 CE), legislation,
management and concession of resources and hydraulic utilization when the waters concur
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in more than one Autonomous Community (Art. 149.1.22 CE) and the necessary legislation
on environmental protection (Art. 149.1.23 CE), among others.
Secondly, the Autonomous Communities can develop the norms on environmental
matters (Art. 148.1.9 CE) and the primary state legislation, being able to assume compe-
tences in the projects, construction and exploitation of the hydraulic uses, channels and
irrigation of interest of the Autonomous Community (Art. 148.1.10 CE). The Autonomous
Communities have great responsibility regarding the determination of urban agglomer-
ations and establishing a representative body of the municipalities located there. The
financing and construction mechanisms of wastewater treatment plants (WWTP) are cre-
ated by public entities, generally at the regional level, and administer and control regional
systems, contracting the management (operation and maintenance) to private companies.
The Autonomous Communities have created Entities dedicated to the purification and san-
itation of wastewater, creating their taxes known as “sanitation canon”. The Autonomous
Communities have issued their regulations on sanitation, developing state legislation, and
defining municipal powers in this area.
Municipal intervention is, in third place, decisive in the matter of sanitation. The
competences in favor of the municipalities are not prescribed in the water legislation, but in
other special laws (Art. 42 Law 14/1986, 25 April 1986, General Health) and in Law 7/1985,
of 2 April 1985, of Bases of the local regime (Arts. 25 and 26). In what interests us now, Art.
25.2.c) of the LBRL indicates that the municipalities have the competence to evacuate and
treat wastewater. Therefore, it should be noted that Local Entities can issue regulations and
ordinances to regulate the sanitation service through, for example, disposal ordinances.
The Art. 26.1.a) of LBRL determines the obligation that the sewerage service be provided
by the municipalities, increasing their legal obligations as the population increases.
Finally, it is possible, increasingly used, that different municipalities are grouped to
provide this service through associative legal forms that make up supra-municipal entities
under the Provincial Councils’ protection and coordination. In these cases, different organi-
zational techniques are used that go through the creation of specific Entities and that use
forms of direct management, concession, concert, association, counties, metropolitan areas,
consortium or supra-municipal entities. By following this idea of supra-municipality of the
service, the Autonomous Communities and the Provincial Councils (within the province)
assume greater management responsibilities to comply with European commitments. Ur-
ban agglomerations, metropolitan areas, but also small municipalities and nuclei of the
dispersed population (think, for example, of the problems that occur in “emptied Spain”)
make it necessary to review the traditional concepts of competition and solidarity by how,
more and more, the administrative limit between municipalities is, and that is the key,
more diffuse, as regards the management of this competence.
The lack of investment in the wastewater system adds to each political entity’s attribu-
tions. It is inserted as one of the most accusing problem, serving Spain’s experience (lack of
investment to maintain and expand the sanitation infrastructures) as a significant warning
for Brazil’s basic sanitation system.
4.4.4. The Problems Linked to the Lack of Investment
The characteristics of the urban water cycle make that they cannot be provided by
small municipalities, so it is common for different administrations to join together to
provide the service and save on infrastructure costs (treatment plants, desalination plants,
constructing collectors). It should note how the local Administration does not have the
resources to undertake the demanded infrastructures. In some cases, the declaration of
“public interest infrastructures” has allowed the State to finance works of the based on
political criteria. The financing of sewage treatment plants, constitute a singular modality
of public works (Art. 122 TRLA), it has been mainly autonomous or State, and, when
the construction of WWTPs has been contracted, the local entities have not always been
contracting authorities.
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The administrations involved in sanitation competences must materialize them by
proceeding to the adequate wastewater: by carrying out planning, equipping and sanitation
actions [37]. Among them, planning has a remarkable impact, either through the National
Hydrological Plan, for the whole of the State, which identifies in its Annexes a good
number of sanitation infrastructures by which they are declared of general interest. Or
through the river basin management plans, for each of the river basin demarcations, which,
through the specific program of measures, establish the environmental quality objectives
and list the necessary infrastructures required for this purpose (Art. 42.g) o’) TRLA).
However, it will be, above all, the specific sanitation plans that will establish the most
relevant actions in this matter, such as the National Plan for Sanitation and Wastewater
Treatment, approved on 17 February 1995, by the Council of Ministers; the National Water
Quality Plan (2007–2015), and, more recently, the currently draft-processing National Plan
for Purification, Sanitation, Efficiency, Savings and Reuse (DSEAR Plan in Spanish) which
aims to achieve greater efficiency in the areas of purification, sanitation and reuse of
reclaimed wastewater, improving the approach of river basin management plans and other
regulations. The DSEAR Plan draft, in brief, considers seven highlights:
1. Define criteria to prioritize the measures defined in hydrological planning.
2. Strengthen cooperation between public administrations.
3. Improve the definition of actions that should be considered of general interest of the
State.
4. Improve the energy and comprehensive efficiency of the purification and reuse plants.
5. Improve the financing mechanisms of the measures.
6. Promote the reuse of wastewater.
7. Promote innovation and technology transfer in the sector of the water.
In any case, sanitation planning corresponds mainly to the Autonomous Communities,
which can also legislate through other sectoral powers such as the environment, spatial
planning and urban planning.
Sanitation systems require a large investment and must be financed according to a
specific economic-financial regime. In Spain’s case, community policies have contributed
generously, over the years, to the construction of technical infrastructures such as treatment
plants and desalination plants. On the other hand, public-private participation mecha-
nisms have been generated through different contractual formulas that assume, from the
infrastructure’s design and construction, to publicly-owned service management. Likewise,
finalist taxes have been created, such as the sanitation fee, which have contributed to
sustaining the system. Sanitation requires a large investment that does not always have
sufficient political return due to the costs of construction, renovation and maintenance
of infrastructure.
Currently, Spain has more than 165,000 km of sewerage network (3.5 m per inhabitant)
and 460 storm tanks and 2300 wastewater stations (WWTP) that purify an annual volume
of 3769 hm3, about 222 liters of water per inhabitant per day. Nevertheless, the water sector
faces financial difficulties that require an economic boost to address the lack of investment
dragging on in recent years, forcing us to rethink the situation (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. General investments in sanitation and purification (blue) and budgeted amount (red) from 2005 to 2019. Source.
Spanish General Water Directorate of the Ministry of Spain-DSEAR Plan draft, 2020.
It insists on the need to approve a Law on the Urban Water Cycle that provides greater
legal security for investments or the need to create an independent regulatory authority, in
the style of what other neighboring countries have done.
The reduction in Spain’s investments is getting more severe than the rest of the
eurozone countries. The low investment made and the planned one compromise the
economic viability and means that the rates do not cover the real costs and only cover the
urban water systems’ operating expenses. The accumulated investment deficit increases,
placing the renewal rate of sewerage networks at around 0.38%, significantly less than the
2% per year, which is estimated as necessary. The XVI National Study on drinking water
and sanitation [18] puts this investment deficit at 3157 million euros per year. The Report
considers it is necessary to invest 1900 million euros in annual work investment, when
479 million euros are invested. Moreover, in 2221 million euros of infrastructure renovation
investment, only 555 million euros are being invested.
The evolution of historical investments in Spain’s water infrastructures has fallen
from 0.36% of GDP (2007–2009) to 0.14% of GDP in the 2014–2017 period. It contrasts with
the situation in the European context countries such as Germany, France, UK, Italy or the
Netherlands, where the trend has been to the upside (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Evolution of historical investments in urban water infrastructures by country (% GDP). Data sources: GWI
Eurostat, Spanish Ministry of Development, AEAS [18].
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Insufficient cost coverage is compounded because the price of water in Spain is sig-
nificantly lower than the European average €7.4 (€88.77 a year) by domestic supply and
sanitation services, with a substantial heterogeneity rate [18]. Technical reports also criti-
cized the spread of jurisdictional responsibilities in deteriorating facilities and services [45].
Some proposals aim to add urban water systems to achieve economies of scale and
develop the companies’ technical and management capacities that provide the service. As
the doctrine points out, this phenomenon must be based on a progressive “pooling of ser-
vice”. The large number of operators (more than 2000 in a territory of 8124 municipalities)
turns the Spanish model into a system with “decentralized, heterogeneous and variable
regulation in the national territory” [46]. When choosing the management formula (direct
or indirect), the traditional administrative discretion tends to be more and more motivated.
As we indicated (see ut supra), at the local level, local competence’s public services
must work most sustainably and efficiently (Art. 85.2 LBRL), which response to no increases
in debt and the possibility of developing a balanced budget. At the state level, Art. 86.2
of Law 40/2015, 1 October 2015, indicates that direct management can only be chosen
if it is a more efficient option than public procurement and is sustainable and effective,
applying economic profitability criteria. In practice, this supposes a principle of economic
subsidiarity (preference for indirect management unless it is reliably proven that direct
management is more efficient and profitable).
On the other hand, there is talk of the need to harmonize tariff criteria and converge
in water prices, through the establishment of transparent tariffs and a correct application of
the principle of cost recovery, as stated the European Court of Justice by indicating that the
recovery of costs established in Art. 9 of the Water Framework Directive “does not impose
a generalized obligation to rate all activities related to water” [47].
The notable differences in water rates, above 300% when comparing some municipali-
ties with others, the highest between Europe regions, have an economic impact on users
and can affect competition, solidarity between areas, and the public-private collaboration
model’s very competitiveness. Despite, these price differences are not always dispropor-
tionate, as they are usually criticized, and respond instead to the technical conditions in
which the service is provided, so an operational analysis must be carried out in reasoned
terms. To this issue, the Spanish Constitutional Court Sentence no. 85/2013, amends the
authorization established by Water Law 1/2006, of the Basque Country region, to determine
the concepts to be included in water use pricing in urban services violating local autonomy.
Considering the financial field, a representative discussion emerges in terms of basic
sanitation and wastewater in Brazil. It is about the opportunity to create a managing entity
or independent institution entity as a necessary step to get neutrality and contribute to
generate economies of scale. Through the Spanish case, Brazil´s case shows that a more
decentralized model could be successful work in an operative way. In the short term, the
Brazilian legal system (according to the new law) would encourage new investments by
creating an independent authority that controls the process form a political and geographic
point of view. In this context, a glace to other European regulatory models can help reach
a more holistic perspective about the suitability to create a specific authority as many of
them have done, as we explain.
4.4.5. Other Regulations in Europe: The Independent Authority as an Element of
Standardization of the Service
Under the modern idea of the integral water cycle, there is a risk that there is hidden
a bidding criterion that harms competition by attributing urban services to the company
that has traditionally provided them in that population. In the last years, there have been
significant political and social movements favoring the return to municipal water services
management in cities such as Paris or Buenos Aires. However, most studies, national and
international, insist on the idea that determining per se a greater effectiveness of what is
public or private is a myth. From an efficiency point of view, the public or private nature of
the operator is irrelevant. Regulation and the institutional framework are the determining
factors for achieving efficiency.
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A more centralized management model could be promoted, attending to specific
objectives and achievements such as economic harmonization and the generation of service
and control standards; or the imposition of new legal and financing forms. For others,
decentralization is positive and shows the ability of the model to adapt to the local envi-
ronment and context, being relevant to establish a homogeneous regulatory framework,
considering that the creation of an independent regulatory entity is not necessary since
planning and basin organizations they can adequately fulfil the functions assigned to this
hypothetical regulatory entity.
Among the centralization supporters, there is discussion about the need to establish
a unifying and independent regulatory entity (robust regulation model) or to create a
more flexible institutional model through a Water Observatory (sunshine regulation). The
2015 Lisbon Charter, drawn up by the International Water Association (IWA), defines the
term “regulatory or regulatory authority” as “the public authority responsible for applying
and enforcing standards, criteria, norms and procedures, which have been politically,
legally or contractually adopted, exercising autonomy in its control over the services, in its
supervisory capacity).
There are varied examples at the European level that advocate a differentiated man-
agement of the urban water cycle. Most of them have an independent regulatory entity that
performs functions aimed at controlling service provision, such as monitoring a national
strategy for regulated sectors; the promotion of clear rules to guarantee legal security
in the industry; the production and making available to all interested parties of reliable
information; the commitment to technological innovation and transparency; the application
of inspection and control mechanisms in relation, mainly, to the contracting conditions and
the relationship of the borrowing entities with the consumers (access to the service, quality
of the service, service rates and others).
Broadly speaking, there are two reference models in Europe: the English model and
the French model. In the English model, first of all, the provision of urban water services is
regulated mainly through private companies, both from a property and system operation
point of view, for which regulatory agencies are created to control the rates applied, the
quality and satisfaction of the service users, the cost recovery mechanisms, etc. Second, the
French model is characterized by establishing a long-term legal relationship between the
government of a territory and a service provider entity through which a “regulation by
contract” is set. The price of the water is negotiated execution of the service delegated.
In England, the Administration continues to be responsible for the public water
service through public agencies that control environmental decisions, the quality of the
water supplied. The interaction with these private companies’ users takes the economic
regulator, OFWAT, which is concerned that private companies are sustainable by recovering
their costs. On the other hand, it deals with assuring the service they provide to users is
efficient and adequate, protecting users from the monopoly of companies and the Public
Administration’s political ambitions [48].
In Portugal, the Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços de Águas e Resíduos, (ERSAR in Por-
tuguese, created by Decree-Law No. 277/2009, integrates water and waste management.
As an independent administrative entity with regulation and supervision functions, it has
broad autonomy of management, administrative, financial and its assets, being attached to
the ministry with powers in environmental matters, but not subject to government super-
vision or surveillance in their exercise functions. This model is based on two levels, the
regulation of the sector; and the regulation of the managing entities’ particular behaviour.
The Italian Regulatory Authority for Electric Power, Gas and the Water System (previ-
ously called AEEGSI, from 2018, ARERA) guarantees the promotion of competition and
efficiency. It aims to promote standards of quality of service. The entity is self-financed
and performs meaningful regulatory, oversight, enforcement and advisory functions. In
2011, a national referendum was held in which it was decided to undertake, among other
issues, the renovation of infrastructures above 65,000 million euros (30 years).
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Given the European experience, we consider it interesting to introduce the debate
on the suitability of creating a unifying and independent regulatory entity in Brazil. It
is a complex mechanism but one that can provide legal certainty and stability. Their
integration does not have to replace or displace the public service holders (this is the case
in countries like England, Wales, Chile). On the contrary, the independent authority can
take regulatory action on tariffs or seek financing mechanisms to work based on efficiency
and scale economies. Faced with a purer model of independent power, one could also opt
for a more flexible model, such as the Netherlands or Portugal, proven effective.
Among the competencies that this hypothetical independent regulator could develop,
are some as relevant as technical intermediation in contracting the service, developing
technical regulations (service orders), controlling public transparency and the rate regime,
etc.
5. Conclusions
The research emphasizes public and private partnership of urban water management,
adapting the regulatory and institutional structure by focusing on basic water sanitation service.
Water policies become involved in a continental country as Brazil is in terms of
territory. In this context, it is needed to consider economic, social, environmental, and
geographical realities. In the meantime, the Spanish model allows us to draw some
perspectives that could be problematic in the Brazilian facts, for example, even though
there is no decentralized regime in Brazil, a new legislative configuration of its “super”
powers for ANA, or, in a practically centralized way.
The necessary wastewater and sanitation policies of a unique state entity (which
has enormous responsibilities in managing the Brazilian national water resource) could
be rethink. The new regulation gives the National Agency—ANA—power to redefine
investments, define the contracting model (technical and mandatory criteria), stimulate
cooperation between the federative entities, and reassess the expansion and universal-
ization of two public coverage services basic sanitation endorsing operations of private
companies. The “new” Brazilian model reports a centralized basic sanitation policy in
a unique administration that is already overloaded with other competencies, creating a
gloomy outlook for the new regime’s succession. The River Basins Authorities themselves
are disregarded, not the new model, not what they have, for example, water for primary
sanitation purposes, a definition of a tariff model and the transparency rules for the sanita-
tion management operation. The need to guarantee basic sanitation on the part of the State
is to create economic and financial stimuli through a safe and stable regulation on public
procurement that limits operational risk assumptions.
The Spanish population is satisfied with urban water management. Wastewater
situation worries due to the need to face the investment deficit. It is necessary to create
financial structures that guarantee water’s social function while ensuring its affordability
and economic viability. Among the Spanish model’s advantages are the operators’ capacity
and technical solvency to face short, medium and long-term projects. On the contrary,
deficiencies have been detected (competency confusion that can lead to the liability system
failures, lack of control by the Public Administration, politicization of management or
investment deficits, meanly). These shortcomings illustrate what the Brazilian legislator
must avoid in implementing and developing the new Brazilian Law.
In both countries Brazil and Spain, we find a dispersed model of regulation. The
different quality of the water, the more or less dispersed urbanization of the residential
centers, the seasonal population in tourist areas, the disparity of autonomous fees, the age
of the supply and sanitation networks, the existence of economies of scale or the way of
finance the facilities, favor the integration of supra-municipal management models. Given
the difficulties of developing the new Brazilian regulatory framework, we believe that it
would be interesting to work on a more specific regulation on urban water management,
which integrates and simplifies the environmental and economic obligations, which intro-
duces the commitment to plan activity and encourage public and private participation.
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This regulation could also generate an accounting structure to guarantee the use of sustain-
able technologies and the generation of new ways of financing, providing neutrality and
rationality in economic, technical and social terms.
The Spanish model works appropriately—it is always possible to improve—with not
an independent regulatory authority in urban water services. This possibility is valid
because it works with significant regulatory, planning, and financial instruments. A
Spanish weakness is focused on the relaxation in the concessionaires’ controls. However,
Spanish wastewater policies depend on the European Union’s community policies. From
an environmental point of view (in terms of water quality, sectoral approaches, specific
environmental directives) and economically (as general economic interest service notion
and its submission to the directive’s of public contract package).
The concessions by indirect management without any control is a potential target for
corruption and undue enrichment. We believe in creating an independent agency that could
be feasible as an autonomy and rationalization of competence in Brazil’s case. The solutions
and strategies for managing public water services in cities lead to control contamination and
public deficit and establish an economic-financial framework that guarantees investment.
Creating an independent regulator could provide technical solutions to reduce the political
burden of decision-making, working based on a standard regulation and discharging tasks
from the National Water Agency, overlapping with competences. Nevertheless, performing
other functions: Evaluating and controlling the performance of operators; Using regulatory
powers; Resolving disputes; Standardizing technical and contractual aspects; Promoting
research projects; Advising the government; Coordinating administrations with interest
groups; Working in the government and transparency of the sector
Brazil’s independent regulatory agency would also foster competitiveness and public
and private collaboration under the service’s shared supervision, but approving the know-
how and knowledge can bring the private sector to a dynamic and primary environment
for society’s interests.
Another Brazilian problem is the scenario and open space for corruption and the lack
of guarantee to fulfil with water Human Rights. The paper aims to highlight two urban
water management mistakes in Spain and their possible usefulness for Brazil institutions.
First, avoid political criteria interference to decide the urban water management model in
each local government instead of attending economic and technical measures. An effort
should make to not determine the model according to ideological approaches by managing
the information with transparency to prevent the decision from behaving like an arcane of
statistical, accounting and budgetary data that do not transcend public opinion. Second,
facing the severe deficit of structural investment in infrastructure and redesign the financial
and budgetary regime.
Brazilian Federal Law No. 14,026/20 should mark an inflexion point facing the future.
To this purpose, we have carried out a comparative analysis of public sanitation policies in
the European Union countries, meanly in Spain. We have set several recommendations and
conclusions that could improve the Brazilian experience in the new federal Law’s renewed
context for basic sanitation.
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